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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the rhetoric of American educators to show that rhetorical analyses can be used to highlight assumed concepts and values within educators' discourses, policies, and practices, and to suggest that greater awareness of their rhetoric can help educators make their communications congruent with their purposes. The paper describes and applies contemporary theories of rhetoric to one feature of educators' discourse, the commonplace. The paper's first section outlines a theory of rhetoric and provides a historical overview. The second section shows how specific commonplaces are congruent with particular conceptions of education, and analyzes one part of a set of commonplaces and contrasts it with other sets of commonplaces. The paper concludes that such analyses can be of value in deciding whether terms of argument are congruent with purposes of discourse. Forty notes are included. (SR)

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A Guide to Commonplaces: On the Uses of Loci in Educators' Discourse

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ABSTRACT

Contemporary theories of rhetoric are described and applied to one feature of educators' discourse, the commonplace. One part of a set of commonplaces is analyzed and contrasted with other sets of commonplaces. It is concluded that such analyses can be of value in deciding whether terms of argument are congruent with purposes of discourse.

In the past two decades, rhetoric as a field of study has been undergoing a resurgence. Philosophers, literary critics, and scientists of language and society have been turning toward the ancient arts and modern scholarship of communications for new ways to investigate contemporary discourses and practices.[1] This paper will draw from some of these current works in raising questions about a specific aspect of rhetoric called the commonplace. A theory of rhetoric will first be briefly outlined, then specific commonplaces will be shown to be congruent with particular conceptions of education. There are two general purposes for this essay about the rhetoric of American educators: first, to show that rhetorical analyses can be used to highlight assumed concepts and values within educators' discourses, policies, and practices; and, second, to suggest that greater awareness of their rhetoric can help educators make their communications congruent with their purposes.

A Theory of Rhetoric

The study of rhetoric is so ancient and prolific that it is difficult to define in brief terms. A concise definition has recently been provided by historian of rhetoric Michael Leff, as follows:

> Apparently rhetoric now is, as it has been throughout its long history, at least three different and somehow related arts:

(1) a managerial or technical art which regulates discourse;

(2) an open-ended, self-regulative art of grounded action that functions within evolving life of a community;

(3) a subversive art that liberates by verbal subversion of technical and communal regulations.[2]

This definition includes three distinct forms: first, strictly technical approaches to communication; second, communications within specific social arrangements; and third, subversions of technical and artistic approaches to communication. We can recognize these related arts in the following general example: an educational policymaker prepares a speech or report, following prevailing standards for clarity and coherence. The policymaker's rhetoric then is interpreted among various communities in such venues as scholarly literature, news media, and in other discourses of administrators and practitioners. In all of the responses, the original act of persuasion is re-formulated through versions of communicative arts grounded in particular situations of social life. At the same time, the original proposal's rhetoric and its successor rhetorics are tested by their audiences, inspiring counter-rhetorics in such forms as critiques, burlesques, or billingsgate. This cycle of related communicative arts is now poised to renew itself as new proposals are adapted to meet updated standards of correctness and effectiveness.

The study of communicative arts has been pursued at least as long as we have written records, and is probably older still

in that rhetoric is usually identified with the production of oral arguments.[3] There are fertile rhetorical traditions in practically every culture. In the West, rhetorical studies were first formalized by Greek sophists and philosophers, whose diverse approaches presently remain with us, as exemplified in Leff's definitions. In successive eras of Western civilization the study of rhetoric was enshrined as one of the trivium, foremost among the seven liberal arts. For many, rhetoric was the predominant art in European culture; as Brian Vickers said,

> rhetoric *was* education *was* culture... It is difficult to grasp this equation today, but it is essential if we are to understand that when writers from Quintillian to Dante to Puttenham say that eloquence is the most important of human disciplines, they mean it literally.[4]

In rhetoric, as in much of Western thought, Aristotle's work was seminal: he referred to rhetoric as an art "not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects," and defined it as "the faculty of observing in any given case the means of persuasion."[5] By the time of the most influential classical rhetorical theorists, Cicero and Quintilian, the production of persuasive discourse was analyzed in terms of the following five discrete components: the *invention* of argumentative premises, the *disposition* of argumentative terms, the *memorization* of topics and terms, the *elocution* of topics and terms in selected words and phrases, and the *delivery* of an entire persuasive speech. Classical rhetorical theorists

recognized three types: *deliberative* rhetoric, for political purposes, *forensic*, for legal purposes, and *epideictic*, for display purposes.[6] The study of rhetoric has flourished in every place where the spoken word is valued, and a wide variety of rhetoricians have offered their versions of typologies, rules, and examples of the "art of speaking well" on any occasion. As such specialized forms of European rhetoric as the sermon, letter, or legal brief were developed, processes of invention, disposition and eloquence were further propounded in countless manuals for winning friends and influencing people.

Although Western philosophers in classical, medieval and early modern eras often conceptualized rhetoric as a form of dialectical reasoning and relegated it to a lower status than analytic reasoning, contemporary rhetoricians arguing for a pragmatist "new rhetoric" assert that such a distinction, in the words of Chaim Perelman and Lois Olbrechts-Tyteca,"introduces a dichotomy, a differentiation between human faculties, which is completely artificial and contrary to the real processes of our thought."[7] Rather than present rhetorical techniques as inferior and possibly antagonistic to logical ones, most twentieth-century rhetoricians claim that dialectic and analytic are closely related, sharing similar ends despite different-seeming means.

In keeping with pragmatist philosophical approaches, contemporary rhetoricians have expanded theories of rhetoric far beyond catalogues of persuasive speaking techniques, assigning a

central role in human affairs to the forms of communication, their social contexts, and their consequences. According to these approaches, rhetorical effectiveness depends on a complex set of relations among the speakers' credibility and eloquence, the audience's aesthetics and credulousness, and the social, political, and cultural contexts that they share in common. A pragmatist theory of rhetoric encompasses both the foregrounds and backgrounds of discourse, involving both techniques of transmission and analyses of reception. As another contemporary rhetorician, Richard McKeon, pointed out, rhetoric is both "productive of arguments and architectonic of attitudes."[8] The frames of reference that give meanings to words are built by speakers and audiences in the circumstances that they occupy. The effectiveness of such exemplary rhetorical works as the Sermon on the Mount or the Gettysburg Address does not depend upon general rules of validity, but lies in specific circumstances under which particular groups of people agree upon certain topics and the styles with which they are presented.

Pragmatist versions of validity are at odds with the idealist traditions of Western philosophy, in which propositions are thought to be detachable from their contexts and amenable to tests whose outcomes are claimed to provide generalizable statements such as laws, principles, or truths. In the apparata of idealist theories, rhetorical arts are either relegated to minor roles in explaining truths or castigated as ways of misleading audiences away from truths.[9] Rhetoricians, if not

overtly committed to a nominalist stance entirely opposed to idealism, usually take a pragmatist position that the concept of truth is a social construction dependent on interpretations derived from social circumstances. According to this approach, a statement need not be proven absolutely true according to permanent, objective standards; it need only warranted by consensually agreeable standards for credibility. While such standards can be submitted to tests of their ethical fairness, logical effectiveness, and so on, it is a pragmatist axiom that such tests cannot refer to foundational truths inaccessible to experience.

The recent renascence of rhetorical studies coincides with a renewed interest in pragmatist philosophies in many disciplines.[10] Most notably, debates over the meanings of the work of Thomas Kuhn in the history and philosophy of science have provoked widespread discussion of the linguistic and pragmatic properties of educational research.[11] Certainly the various arts and sciences of communication, whether they are classical, liberal or technical, have always been the main stock in trade of education.

Contemporary rhetorical studies therefore emphasize the importance of communications among scholarly disciplines, rather than criticisms of any one discipline in the terms of another.[12] In the following section this approach will be followed in analyzing the uses of the commonplace, a rhetorical feature that occurs widely in scholarly discourse. Although it is often

treated as a synonym for everyday and familiar terms, the commonplace is an elusive concept, often hiding complex assumptions and contradictory positions in plain sight.

A Guide to Commonplaces

Rhetoricians since classical times have built elaborate theories of topics, or starting-points for discourse. Based upon the Greek word *topos*, for "place," topics are by analogy the realms in which ideas are formed.[13] Certain topics that audiences find readily recognizable and acceptable are recognized by rhetoricians as commonplaces, that is, especially effective means of placing terms of argument before specific audiences.

In classical theories of topics, so-called "common places" were identified as general topics of discussion common to all interests, whereas "proper places" were specific topics reserved for specialized audiences. As prescribed by Aristotle and Cicero, commonplaces of invention were innovative topics with general appeal, and commonplaces of memory were already familiar topics. Through continued usage, however, variant meanings of the term were often combined into one denoting stock devices for preparing and memorizing persuasive arguments. In the commonplace books promulgated by medieval rhetoricians, the term

came to connote little more than formulaic exercises. Rhetoricians nevertheless recognized that commonplaces contained complex ideas behind simple facades. In commenting on the complexities of commonplaces - using the equivalent Latin term, *loci* - Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecha said,

> ...it is amazing that even when very general *loci* [commonplaces] are concerned, each *locus* [commonplace] can be confronted by one that is contrary to it: thus, to the classical *locus* of the superiority of the lasting, one may oppose the romantic *locus* of the superiority of that which is precarious and fleeting. It is accordingly possible to characterize societies not only by the particular values they prize most but by the intensity with which they adhere to one or the other of a pair of antithetical *loci*. [14]

Understanding commonplaces therefore involves examining the values that are assumed by those who use them.

Can there be any workable definition of the commonplace, a concept that is intricately bound to various values and customs? Despite Nietzsche's warning that "only that which has no history is definable,"[15] rhetoricians past and present have proposed ways to discern this feature of their arts. For purposes of this analysis, McKeon's definition of commonplaces suitably describes their evocative power and ambivalent meanings:

> A commonplace is a place or seat of arguments; it is not itself an argument but a heuristic device by which issues that have

never been considered before suggest distinctions and relations to be examined in search for solutions. Some problems recur frequently, however, and a 'commonplace' has come to mean the irreflective repetition of identical formulae as an easy substitute for the invention of a pertinent solution.[16]

Innovative commonplaces often emerge from compromises that accommodate speakers' terms of argument with audiences' values and expectations, figuratively discovering common ground among diverse interests. For example, advocates of large-scale changes in schooling practices during the era of educational progressivism drew upon everyday imagery of industrial machinery for commonplaces to present their precepts. When John Franklin Bobbitt spoke out for implementing scientific management in education, he chose the following topics: "fully-used plant, efficient production, minimal waste, and adaptation of raw material to finished product."[17] By finding ways to transmit new ideas in commonsense terms, such commonplaces were instrumental in persuasively advocating new forms of schooling.

If Bobbitt's commonplaces seem archaic and inappropriate to the problems of contemporary schooling, then they have not passed McKeon's two-pronged test: in order to maintain continued rhetorical congruence, commonplaces must illustrate new ways to address new problems in terms that appear nonetheless familiar. In the next section this standard of rhetorical success will be applied to a set of commonplaces widely employed in current

discussions about educational reform. It was originally presented by Joseph Schwab as follows:

> Defensible educational thought must take account of four commonplaces of *equal* rank: the learner, the teacher, the milieu, and the subject matter. None of these can be omitted without omitting a vital factor in educational thought and practice.[18]

Schwab proposed this all-inclusive set of general topics in arguing for coordinated curricular reforms during the late 1960s. He asserted that post-Sputnik curricular reforms of the late '50s had over-emphasized the importance of subject matters, and that Progressive reforms had over-emphasized the importance of learners. Likewise, he claimed, "social-change-centered curricula of the 1930s" had given priority to educational milieux, and "unionism" had over-emphasized teachers.[19] In his commonplaces, Schwab advocated that educators must even-handedly mediate diverse interests involved in schooling reforms.

To ask a rhetorical question, are these commonplaces of use in finding new ways to discuss educational reforms? In reply, some assumptions and consequences of Schwab's rhetoric will be examined, concentrating on one commonplace, that of the teacher. Because of its limited scope, this example of rhetorical criticism should not be construed as a broad commentary on Schwab's extensive and influential works, but only as a demonstration of the complexities that inhabit all discourses

and practices, especially those in the vast and intricate realm of education.

Schwab, in his essays on "practical" curricular reforms, urges that equal importance be given to the commonplace of "teacher." He stated that the practical knowledge of classroom teachers should be an integral part of deliberations about reforming the curriculum. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the role given to teachers in this scheme is subject to implicit limitations. Schwab asserts that practical knowledge should be collected and analyzed by curriculum specialists who would "instigate, administer, and chair" changes in subject matter.[20] Schwab here seems to condone the subordination of teachers to some presumed allies not located within one of the four equivalent commonplaces, on the grounds that specialists alone possess the necessary expertise to find equilibrium among all involved parties.

Relations among specialists and teachers are not so simple, however; the topic of "who shall teach" has long been a site for conflict instead of even-handed compromise.[21] Ever since the inception of American public schools, the standings and purposes of educational practitioners and experts have been controversial. In the mid-nineteenth century, proposals for common school reforms provoked wide debate, in particular over the means by which teachers would be qualified to operate what Horace Mann called the "balance-wheel of society."[22] Mann proposed that experts housed in supposedly non-sectarian and

apolitical normal schools would prepare professionals to serve in the schools that were envisioned as "the most effective and benignant of all the forces of civilization."[23] From the outset, policymakers like Mann set the agendas of public schools, while declaring that their purposes and actions were politically and morally neutral.

It has often been pointed out, however, that expertise is always laden with specific interests and values.[24] For example, in reply to Mann's proposals for creating a system that supposedly would prepare non-partisan professionals, Orestes Brownson retorted that

> ...all education that is worth anything is either religious or political, and fits us for discharging our duties, either as simple human beings, or as members of society. ... Who then are to be teachers in these Normal Schools? What is to be taught in them? Religion and politics? What religion, what politics? ... These teachers must either have some religious faith, or none. If they have none, they are mere negations, and therefore unfit to be trusted with the education of the educators of our children. If they have a religious and political faith, they will have one which only a part of the community hold to be true. [25]

A deep dilemma is incurred by making a commonplace into which all educators would be placed together: in an educational system that aspires to pluralistic democracy, how can a single approach to teaching encompass the entire range of political and

spiritual beliefs? During the past century and one-half, numerous "scientific" approaches to curriculum and instruction have been proposed as solutions to this quandary, but it still appears that the commonplace of the teacher is contested terrain. As Brownson envisioned, teachers are still subject to disdain, treated at best as semi-professionals and at worst as negations. Educational experts are likewise relegated to academic marginality; as Judith Lanier and Judith Warren Little conclude their review of research on teacher education, teachers and teacher-educators still comprise a "difficult-to-locate, easy-to-overlook, and much-maligned" group.[26] If commonplaces are attempts to find grounds for agreement, or, in Schwab's words, "a map on which each member of a plurality can be located relative to its fellow members,"[27] then the commonplace of "teacher" has not been proven successful in winning adherents in academia or the public at large and their place on the map is politically and economically marginal.

Schwab says that, teachers should be "knowledgeable" and "flexible" in their dealings with experts.[28] This could be read to infer that teachers should concede political autonomy to experts in the name of professionalism, although the interests of specialists are not necessarily identical with those of teachers. As Cleo Cherryholmes said,

> [Schwab's] proposal for an active role for curriculum professors turns out to be passive and politically conservative. Politically neutral expertise takes a stand in

favor of things as they are because nothing is said about what should be changed or to what end(s).[29]

Schwab's commonplace could be used to endorse longstanding patterns of subordination that separate teachers from administrators and specialists. These divisions usually follow lines of class, race, and gender, as Brownson foresaw and current critics repeat.[30] Recent initiatives for "professionalization" or "empowerment" in the schools are meant to address practicing teachers' subordinate roles, but often serve teachers' interests indirectly through the mediation of professional organizations or state and local administrators and policymakers. These bureaucracies often perpetuate hierarchical relations, undermining reformers' purposes and exacerbating many teachers' sense of powerlessness.[31]

Although the use of commonplaces is an attempt to make compromises among various viewpoints, any compromise incorporates specific philosophical and political perspectives. While explicitly accommodating his commonplaces to practical school conditions, Schwab's assertions indicate that these topics are nonetheless based upon hierarchical social relations and idealized conceptions of education. These conceptions may be detected in his claim that the process of discovering curricular forms may be tentative, but that the product of curriculum deliberation is theoretical knowledge, which has a uniform nature: "The very fabric of the practical ... consists of the richly endowed and variable particulars upon which theory

abstracts and idealizes its uniformities."[32] Similarly, his Arnoldian claim that curricula should be the "best statement of our present knowledge of the human make,"[33] seems to idealize the ways of knowing of a particular culture (i.e., Western science).

Schwab's commonplaces would therefore seem to accommodate into liberal pedagogy a compound of two parts of Platonic idealism to one part of Deweyan pragmatism. In building these apparently practical topics upon specific notions of "science" and "quality," it is possible to strike a posture of even-handed liberality while nonetheless favoring a specific set of cultural and political interests. These interests, despite their tone of common sense, are specifically partisan. From a pragmatist approach, there are no universally true propositions upon which a credible rhetorical strategy can be based. Schwab's commonplaces, like Mann's trope of the balance-wheel, cannot be detached from their specific contexts and particular interests. Just as Brownson pointed out, generalized conceptions of quality must be evaluated in their specific spiritual and political circumstances. Schwab's commonplaces, in attempting to gain adherence from educators by applying topics of scientific and educational inquiry to teachers' everyday situations, incorporate notions of reform that explicitly claim to meet universal human needs but nevertheless implicitly follow specific cultural and political agendas.

In short, Schwab's formulation of the commonplace of teacher does not address longstanding controversies over the conceptions, policies and practices of curriculum upheld by administrators, specialists, and teachers. By telescoping relations among teachers, administrators and experts within a single category, this commonplace is not congruent with all the circumstances and consequences of schooling. Furthermore, by judging practical knowledge according to idealistic standards, the commonplace is also not congruent with the diverse cultural contexts in which knowledge is defined and evaluated. A commonplace can hardly win adherence if it harbors more friction than compromise. Lanier and Little, in using Schwab's set of commonplaces to draw attention to controversies surrounding the education of teachers, say that a "rhetoric of importance ... disguises the harsh realities of teaching." [34] It is ironic that their dispositional device, Schwab's set of commonplaces, apparently is a source of such rhetoric.[35]

Effective communications are thwarted when the topics of discussion are not congruent with speakers' and audiences' purposes. Commonplaces should serve as heuristic devices that, in McKeon's words, "suggest distinctions and relations to be examined in search for solutions." If they fail to find pertinent new ideas, they degenerate into "the irreflective repetition of identical formulae as an easy substitute for the invention of a pertinent solution." According to this approach, successful commonplaces are invented or reconstructed by

advocates and audiences who jointly participate in rhetorical arts of adapting specific ideas to their purposes in unique ways.

There are examples of commonplaces that can be applied to today's educational topics in innovative ways. One of the most influential rhetorical theorists of our time, Kenneth Burke, has proposed a scheme of commonplaces that can accommodate multiple viewpoints and shifting relations. His "dramatist pentad" for categorizing communicative actions is as follows:

> In a rounded statement about motives, you must have some word that names the *act* (names what took place in thought and deed), and another that names the *scene* (the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred); also you must indicate what person or kind of person *(agent)* performed the act, what means or instruments he used *(agency)*, and the *purpose*.[36]

Burke's set of commonplace categories is open to ambiguities: teacher education may be said to involve multiple agents (e.g., teachers and students), in many possible scenes, for various purposes. Such commonplaces emphasize ongoing dialogues in which language and action are contingent upon their immediate circumstances and can assume multiple interpreted meanings. Rather than collapse these meanings into distinctively separate categories, Burke's commonplaces stress their inter-relations in the form of a drama.

Instead of Schwab's metaphor of commonplaces as a static map, Burke places the categories of argument on a dynamic stage.

His commonplaces not only permit diverse perspectives, but demand them since any scene is assumed to contain more than one agent or action. The motives of experts and administrators pursuing educational reforms may be portrayed in interaction with those of teachers struggling for professional status as well as with those of students striving for personal and cultural identity. From a dramatist perspective, commonplaces of teaching can be treated as texts from diverse interpretive perspectives among the players, their settings, and their audiences; as Burke states, "Accordingly, what we want is *not terms that avoid ambiguity,* but *terms that clearly reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise.*"[37]

Some examples of commonplaces of teaching exemplify the dynamic interactions modelled in Burke's pentad: for example, there is Dewey's commonplace, "the school as society," which he claimed was a dynamic set of relations among social arrangements and individual purposes. More recently, Elliott Eisner has proposed a conception of "educational connoisseurship" that frames educational transactions within dynamic and complex categories. In Eisner's versions of criticism and evaluation, the critic and the teacher are both portrayed as actors, just as a narrator or chorus stands apart from dramatic conflict, but still resides within the scene.[38] Students, parents and community members appear in these scenes, sometimes as antagonists, but always as participants whose actions overlap and purposes cross. Despite a pronounced tendency to give

preferential treatment to the critics' perspectives, these commonplaces do portray varied actors employing their particular purposes and agencies in dynamic relations, not fixed categories within a static model.

As these examples show, the kinds of commonplaces that are used to argue for educational reforms incorporate specific conceptions of education which can be in conflict with the reformers' stated intentions. The consequences of these rhetorical cross-purposes are mixed or subverted messages that eventually serve to undermine the purposes of reform programs, perpetuating institutional conditions that hinder change. In the complex social environments of schools, commonplaces are parts of the cycle of related communicative arts that link various parties, especially during periods of change, as they act out the effects of their individual and collective persuasions. Commonplaces are not fixed entities that can be transported intact into various circumstances, but must be reconstructed each time they are used. The processes of reconstruction require full inquiry into the assumptions, circumstances, and consequences of words and deeds.

Half a century ago, Dewey reminded those who would reform schools that the sources of educational science should be "large and fruitful hypotheses" and "philosophical questions."[39] Taking a similarly pragmatist approach to the sources of commonplaces, McKeon said,

> A new schematism of commonplaces is needed to make the exploration of the new a proper method of philosophy; and a new examination of demonstration, deliberation and decision is needed to make the treatment of what is the case or what may made to be the case a proper method of philosophy. The new problems encountered in the world today as a result of increase in things known must be considered in commonplaces of invention rather than in commonplaces of past problems. The interplays of peoples and of subject matters suggest new issues which must be explored by stating new questions rather than facilely reducing them to old theses.[40]

Commonplaces, like common sense, are readily accessible points of reference that have wide audience appeal, but often at the cost of over-simplification. Recent discourses among educators have featured such commonplaces as "excellence and equality," or "cooperation, competition and individualization," or "theory into practice," or "race, class and gender." Like all commonplaces, these risk becoming formulae that substitute familiarity for acuity. In the ancient and literal senses of the term, commonplaces should be broad avenues on which various parties can find each other to take joint action, rather than dead ends that defeat interaction.

Conclusion

As exemplified above, commonplaces of argument may be compared to show how diverse ideas of stability and change in education are synthesized in commonsense topics literally taken for granted. This brief essay into rhetorical analysis would seem to suggest two very simple conclusions: first, that the ancient arts and modern scholarship of rhetoric can provide some fertile ground for raising questions about the way educators persuade and are persuaded to act. Next, it also seems that, despite inherent risks, particular rhetorical strategies can provide for effective communication under certain circumstances. It is therefore important for educators to increase their awareness of the various inter-related arts of rhetoric that are incorporated in the daily practices of planning, teaching, and learning.

In the particular and continuously changing circumstances of classrooms, corridors and meetings, the rhetorics of reform take effect. While such changing particulars would seem to prohibit making general rules or even cautious implications, they can have a persuasiveness of their own. Educators, who are so dependent upon communications for their identities and their daily practices, might benefit from close examinations of the communicative arts that they find persuasive. In paying closer attention to commonplaces that are taken for granted, researchers, policymakers, practitioners, in universities,

schools, and communities could employ the arts of rhetoric to foster greater awareness of the contradictions and pitfalls that surround the problems of stability and change in fast-moving and dangerous times.

Notes

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[1] See: M. Billig, *Arguing and Thinking*. (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); L. Bitzer & E. Black (eds.), *The Prospect of Rhetoric*. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971); S. Fish, *Doing What Comes Naturally*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); T. Eagleton, *Literary Theory: An Introduction*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983); Ch. Perelman & L. Olbrects-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*. (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1969); J. Nelson, A. Megill & D. McCloskey (eds.), *Rhetoric of the Human Sciences*. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); H. Simons, *Rhetoric in the Human Sciences*. (London: Sage, 1989); H. Simons & T. Melia (eds.), *The Legacy of Kenneth Burke*. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989); S. Tyler, *The Unspeakable: Discourse, Dialogue, and Rhetoric in the Postmodern World*.

(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); B. Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric*. (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

[2] M. Leff, "Re-reading the History of Rhetoric." Paper presented at Carl-August University, Goettingen, Germany. (August 1988), pp. 17-18.

[3] Although there remain numerous important distinctions between oral and written rhetoric, contemporary rhetorical theorists frequently address both types of argument: e.g., W. Ong, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word*. (London & New York: Methuen, 1982).

[4] B. Vickers, "A Concise History of Rhetoric," in *idem.*, *Classical Rhetoric and English Poetry*. (Carbondale & Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), p. 23.

[5] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, Book I, Chapter 2, line 26 (ed. R. McKeon), *The Basic Works of Aristotle*. (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 1329.

[6] Vickers, "Concise History of Rhetoric," pp. 65-73.

[7] Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, p. 3.

[8] R. McKeon, *Rhetoric: Essays in Invention & Discovery*, ed. M Backman (Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press, 1987), Ch. 1.

[9] This distinction is made in Plato's *Gorgias*, is repeated in classical, medieval, and Renaissance Latin treatises (see: Leff, "Re-reading the History of Rhetoric"), and is still evident in contemporary derogations of misleading rhetoric. See: R. Lanham, "The 'Q' Question." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 87, no.4 (1988): 654-700.

[10] See: R. Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982); C. West, *The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism*. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).

[11] T. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (2d ed.). (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). See: T. Popkewitz, *Paradigm and Ideology in Educational Research*. (London & Philadelphia: Falmer Press, 1984); L. Shulman, "Paradigms and Research Programs in the Study of Teaching," ed. M. Wittrock, *Handbook of Research on Teaching*, 3d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1986), ch.1.

[12] E.g., Nelson et al., *Rhetoric of the Human Sciences*.

[13] This analogy has often been extended into an allegory in which the speaker seeks truth within a topic just as a hunter seeks game in a hunting-ground. See: M. Leff, "The Topics of Argumentative Invention." *Rhetorica* 1, no.1 (1983): 24.

[14] Perelman & Olbrechts-Tytecha, *The New Rhetoric*, p. 85.

[15] F. Nietzsche, Toward a Genealogy of Morals." ed. and trans. W. Kaufmann, *The Portable Nietzsche*.(New York: Viking, 1954), p. 453.

[16] McKeon, *Rhetoric*, p. 53.

[17] J. F. Bobbitt, "The Elimination of Waste in Education." *The Elementary School Teacher* 12, no. 6, (1912): 259-269.

[18] J. Schwab, *Science, Curriculum, and Liberal Education*, eds. I. Westbury & J. Wilkoff. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 371.

[19] *ibid.*

[20] *ibid.*, pp. 368-370.

[21] On the other hand, locating specialists, administrators and policymakers within the commonplace of "milieu" would minimize

these conflicts, but would entail the assumption that hierarchical relations among educators are natural and inevitable.

[22] See: L. Cremin, *American Education: The Metropolitan Experience.* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988); M. Katz, *Reconstructing American Education.* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); P. Mattingly, *The Classless Profession.* New York: NYU Press).

[23] H. Mann, *Twelfth Annual Report of the Board of Education Together with the Twelfth Annual Report of the Secretary of the Board.* (Boston: Dutton & Wentworth, 1849), p. 42.

[24] See: M. Apple, *Teachers and Texts.* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987); R. Callahan, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); D. Tyack & E. Hansot, *Managers of Virtue.* (New York: Basic Books, 1982).

[25] O. Brownson, "Education of the People," *Boston Quarterly Review* 2, no. 4, (1839): 402-5.

[26] J. Lanier & J. Warren Little, "Research on Teacher Education", ed. M. Wittrock, *Handbook of Research on Teaching*, 3d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1986), p. 535.

[27] Schwab, *Science, Curriculum, and Liberal Education*, p.339.

[28] *ibid.*

[29] C. Cherryholmes, *Power and Criticism: Poststructural Investigations in Education.* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1988), p. 43.

[30] See: Cremin, *American Education*, pp. 497-498. Also see: M. Grumet, *Bitter Milk: Women and Teaching.* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988); C. McCarthy, "Rethinking Radical and Liberal Perspectives on Racial Inequality in Schooling." *Harvard Educational Review* 58, no. 3 (1988): 265-279.

[31] See: S. Conley, T. Schmidle, & J. Shedd, "Teacher Participation in the Management of School Systems." *Teachers College Record* 90, no. 2 (1988): 259-280; J. Glanz, "Beyond Bureaucracy: Notes on the Professionalization of School Supervision." *Journal of Curriculum and Supervision* 5, no. 2 (1990): 150-170; C. Kerchner & D. Mitchell, *The Changing Idea of a Teachers' Union.* (Philadelphia: Falmer Press, 1988).

[32] Schwab, *Science, Curriculum, and Liberal Education*, p. 324.

[33] *ibid.*, p. 125.

[34] Lanier & Warren Little, "Research on Teacher Education", p. 565.

[35] It is evident that Schwab, a junior colleague of McKeon's at the University of Chicago, was familiar with his approach to rhetoric, and in particular with his work on commonplaces. See: I. Westbury & J. Wilkoff, "Introduction," in Schwab, *Science, Curriculum, and Liberal Education*, pp. 14-17.

[36] K. Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. xv. Burke has since added a sixth category, "attitude," making a "hexad." See: Simons & Melia, *The Legacy of Kenneth Burke*, p. 72.

[37] Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, p. xviii. Author's italics.

[38] E. Eisner, *The Educational Imagination: On the Design and Evaluation of School Programs*, 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1985).

[39] J. Dewey, "The Sources of a Science of Education," ed. J. Boydston, *John Dewey: The Later Works*, vol. 5 (Carbondale & Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), p.28.

[40] McKeon, *Rhetoric*, pp. 64-65.